ABSTRACT
Introduction
Many developed countries have experienced marked increases in immigration in recent decades. As a result, there has been a renewed interest in the economic consequences of immigration, and a number of papers analysing the effects on the wages of native workers have emerged. Although the papers differ in their choice of econometric approach, the underlying idea is the same: Immigration increases the supply of certain types of labour which in turn affects the marginal product of all types of labour and hence the wages of native workers in a competitive labour market. The size and direction of these effects depend both on the realised inflows of immigrants and the assumed or estimated substitution patterns between different types of labour. This is where the disagreement starts. As a consequence, some studies find relatively large negative effects of recent immigrant inflows on the wages of native workers (Borjas, 2003 (Borjas, , 2006 Borjas, 2007, and Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997) , while other studies find much smaller effects Peri, 2005, 2006; and Card, 1990 and Card, , 2001 and Card, , 2005 .
In this paper, we propose and test an additional effect of immigration on the wages of native workers. We argue that immigration may not only affect wage formation through a change in the supply of labour at the aggregate level. If labour markets are not fully competitive, an increased use of immigrants at the firm level may directly influence the wages of native workers employed in the firm. This results in distributional consequences of immigration not captured by the aggregate supply side approach used in the existing literature.
There exists solid empirical evidence that wages are firm specific; see Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) , Hildretch and Oswald (1997) , and Arai (2003) among others.
Local use of immigrants may therefore affect wage formation at the firm level through, e.g., bargaining effects or efficiency wages. Specifically, we shall argue that immigrants employed in a firm often have other outside options (and therefore other wages) than native workers. In particular, many immigrants are likely to have worse outside options due to language and cultural barriers as well as institutional discrimination against immigrants. Furthermore, the employment of workers with other/worse outside options may affect not only their own wages, but the wages of all workers in the firm. One possibility is that it signals to other workers that the firm has "access" to relatively cheap labour. This improves the bargaining position of the firm vis-à-vis the workers; see, e.g., Rodrik (1997) . Another possibility, which we pursue below, is that the wage norm in the firm changes when workers with different outside options are employed.
To show this, we set up an efficiency wage model where the work effort depends on the extent to which wages are considered to be fair; see Akerlof and Yellen (1990) . We then illustrate how an increase in the share of workers with poorer outside options gives rise to a decrease in the wage norm in the firm, which in turn lowers the wages to all workers in the firm. Assuming that outside options are particularly bad for immigrants from less developed countries (LDCs) -and we shall document below that this is the case -the simple theoretical model leads to an immediately testable empirical hypothesis: A higher share of immigrants from less developed countries in the firm (or workplace) employment will reduce the wages of native workers. 1 This hypothesis is tested using linked employer-employee data for 1993-2004 from a developed country (Denmark) that has experienced a particularly pronounced increase in the employment of immigrants. As we have observations on all individuals in the Danish labour market, we are able to construct very detailed measures of the use of immigrants at the workplace level. Furthermore, as data are register based, measurement problems are negligible. The results are therefore unlikely to suffer from the problem of attenuation bias which has recently been emphasised by Aydemir and Borjas (2005) . 1 That outside options are particularly bad for immigrants from less developed countries follows from the fact that most of them are refugees or family reunified who cannot freely move to another country or return to their home country. Furthermore, compared to Danes and other immigrants, they have more restricted access to public benefits, and cultural and language barriers are typically larger than for immigrants from more developed countries. See also Section 3.1 below.
Our OLS estimates do indeed show a significant negative relationship between the share of immigrants from less developed countries in the workplace employment and the wages of native workers. From the OLS estimates we can, however, not conclude whether this represents a causal effect of the immigrants. An alternative explanation may be that certain types of workplaces both attract many immigrants and pay lower wages, or that certain native workers select into workplaces with a high share of immigrants.
While we use fixed effects for each combination of worker and workplace -so-called job-spell fixed effects -to take care of time-invariant omitted variables affecting both the wages of native workers and the share of immigrants, temporary shocks to demand may still lead to reverse causality. A priori, we would expect a positive firm-specific demand shock to increase both the wages of native workers and the immigrant share, as immigrants -due to their higher unemployment rate -are more easily available in the job market; see also Borjas (2001) . This in turn creates an upward bias on the OLS and fixed effects estimates of the effect of immigrants on wages.
To deal with this problem, we instrument the share of immigrants in the workplace employment using the historical immigrant share at the workplace (5 years prior to the first year of our sample) interacted with the country level development in the employment of immigrants, which can safely be assumed exogenous to the individual firm. The idea behind this instrument is that workplaces with a high initial share of immigrants are also more likely to receive the largest subsequent inflows of immigrants both due to the presence of immigrant networks and because workplaces that have experience with using immigrants may have lower marginal costs of employing additional immigrants. With fixed effects at the job-spell level, this instrument is by construction valid as long as firm-specific temporary shocks to demand are not too long lasting (more than five years).
2 Similar types of instruments have also been used by, e.g., Card (2001) , Ottaviano and Peri (2005) , and Cortes (2006) to instrument the regional shares of immigrants.
2 Note that firm-specific permanent shocks are not a problem here since they will be captured by the jobspell fixed effects.
4
Our fixed effects and IV estimations confirm that a higher share of immigrants from less developed countries has a negative impact on the wages of native workers. As expected, the IV estimates are also considerably more negative than the other estimates.
To throw some further light on the channel through which LDC immigrants lower the wages of native co-workers, we perform a couple of additional analyses. First, we consider the importance of immigrants from more developed countries. As these immigrants have much better outside options than immigrants from less developed countries, we should expect these to have much less negative effects (if negative at all) on the wages of native workers, provided that our hypothesis about the importance of different outside options is correct. This is exactly what we find.
Second, we run regressions separately for different educational groups of native workers to check whether the effects of immigrants from less developed countries reflect a general effect on the wage norm or a substitution effect at the workplace level in the sense that the native workers most similar to the immigrants see their marginal value and hence their bargaining power decrease. In the latter case, only the wages of less-skilled native workers should be lowered, as these are most similar to the LDC immigrants.
However, we find that the use of immigrants from less developed countries affect highskilled and low-skilled native workers almost equally. This strongly suggests that the estimated effect is not simply due to substitution effects at the workplace level, but (at least partly) represents a more general effect on the wage norm in the firm.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Data are described in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our theoretical model and outline the empirical strategy. Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 around here]
In addition to the variables listed in Denmark is an interesting case to study since it is one of the European countries that has experienced the strongest relative increase in the employment of immigrants. Figure 1 shows the development in the importance of each of the three groups of immigrants in total employment in the period 1993-2004. We can see that especially the share of immigrants from less developed countries in total employment has increased dramatically in the period considered. Its share has more than doubled from around 1% in 1993-94 to well above 2% ten years later.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Theory and Empirical Strategy
If goods and labour markets are perfectly competitive, workers with identical qualifications will get the same wage, irrespectively of where they work. In that case, there should be no effects on the wages of native workers from hiring immigrants at the workplace. In contrast, if goods markets are imperfectly competitive and firms earn rents, there may be room for firm-specific wages where firms and workers somehow share the rents. There exists considerable evidence of such rent sharing taking place in practice;
see, e.g., Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) , Hildretch and Oswald (1997) and Arai (2003) . This in turn leaves room for firm and workplace specific characteristicsincluding the use of immigrants -to play a role for individual wages.
If the hiring of immigrants should matter for the wages of native co-workers, immigrants must somehow differ from native workers in economically important ways. Our hypothesis is that immigrants have other outside options. Moreover, immigrants from different parts of the world have different outside options. In Section 3.1, we further argue why we should expect this to be the case and present some evidence to support our claim. Section 3.2 then outlines an efficiency wage model that shows how outside options of individual workers affect wages of all workers in the firm. This model results directly in a testable hypothesis about the link between the share of immigrants in the firm and the wages of native workers. Finally, Section 3.3 presents the empirical strategy used to test this hypothesis.
Immigrants and Native Workers
In this section, we argue that an important difference between native workers and different types of immigrant workers is that they do not have the same options outside the firm.
Above, we distinguished between three groups of immigrants. The first group consists of immigrants from the EU-15 countries, Norway and Iceland. Immigrants from these countries have relatively good options outside their current employment. They can freely move to another EU-country, and they come from countries which are similar to Denmark with respect to culture and institutions. When it comes to immigrants from the Nordic countries, the language barrier is furthermore minimal. Moreover, as (most of) these immigrants are EU-citizens, they have the same rights to support from the public sector (including social benefits) as Danish citizens.
The third group is the immigrants from less developed countries (LDC immigrants). We expect these immigrants to have the worst outside options. Most of them have come to
Denmark as refugees or as a result of family reunification. Typically, they cannot freely move to another country or return to their home country. Furthermore, they come from countries having a culture and a language which are often very different from the Danish.
Finally, they do not have the same rights to support from the public sector as EU citizens.
The second group of immigrants (immigrants from all remaining developed countries)
constitutes an intermediate case.
Immigrants from these countries have culture and language barriers most similar to those from group 1, and like group 1 immigrants, they are typically free to return to their home country or move on to a third country. However, they do not have the same rights to, e.g., social benefits in Denmark as EU-citizens have.
In sum, we should expect outside options to be particularly bad for immigrants from less developed countries whereas immigrants from EU-15 countries (group 1) are likely to have the best options outside their current employment. For immigrants from groups 1 and 2, outside options may in fact be better than for many Danish employees, as these immigrants also have the option to return to their home country at relatively low costs.
We cannot directly estimate the outside options of the different types of immigrants and native workers as these are determined by their opportunities inside as well as outside
Denmark. However, with respect to their opportunities inside Denmark, the average wage and the unemployment rate for workers of their type are at least two rough indications of their options outside their current employment.
The first two columns of Table 3 .
The results in the third column of Table 3 are from a Probit estimation over the entire workforce where the dependent variable is a dummy for being unemployed in 2004.
Explanatory variables are otherwise as in the wage regressions, except that the industry dummies cannot be included now. The reported numbers are the marginal effects on the unemployment probability of belonging to one of the three groups of immigrants (calculated in the mean of the data).
[Insert Table 3 around here]
We see that the wages of immigrants from EU-15 countries are almost the same as for native workers. In fact, for full-time employees, the coefficient estimate is slightly positive, although not significant. (1) and (2), we restrict attention to wage workers.
These findings are consistent with results in Husted et al. (2001) who show that both wages and employment probabilities are particularly low for refugee immigrants in Denmark, especially in the first years after their entry.
While the results from Table 3 -and the additional evidence from Husted et al. (2001) -do not provide a final proof of outside options being worse for immigrants from less developed countries, they strongly indicate that this is the case. They are also consistent with our conjecture that immigrants from EU-15 are those having the best outside options, whereas group 2 immigrants constitute an intermediate case.
In the analyses to follow, we shall focus on the effects of immigrants from less developed countries (LDC immigrants) as they appear to be the ones with the most pronounced differences relative to the native workers. In Section 4.2, we will, however, return to the importance of the other types of immigrants.
An Efficiency Wage Model
In this section, we show how poor outside options of some employees in a firm (the immigrants) may affect the wages of all workers in the firm. One possibility is that native workers in firms using more immigrant workers may see their bargaining position vis-à-vis the firm getting worse. If native workers are considered as being the insiders in the firm with relatively high wages, employment of immigrants with worse outside options may signal to these insiders that the firm has another and cheaper source of labour to draw from. This may in turn weaken the bargaining position of the insiders, i.e., the native workers; see, e.g., Lindbeck and Snower (1986) and Rodrik (1997) .
Another possibility is that a trade union in the firm bargains over wages on behalf of all workers in the firm. In case of such collective bargaining, the wage is likely to depend on the average outside option of all the employees; see, e.g., McDonald and Solow (1981) . If more immigrant workers imply that the average employee has worse outside options, the wage level in the firm is likely to decrease.
In the following, we focus on a third possibility, namely that the employment of immigrants affects the wage norm in the firm. Immigrant workers with poor outside options are likely to accept relatively low wages. This is consistent with the empirical evidence above. Therefore, employment of these immigrants may decrease the wage norm in the firm which negatively affects the wages of all other workers in the firm. In the following, we illustrate how this mechanism may work in a simple efficiency wage model building on the fair wage-effort hypothesis present in, e.g., Akerlof and Yellen (1990) . 8 We assume that there are two types of workers in a firm: Native workers and immigrants.
The outside option for immigrant workers is R I , and for native workers it is R N , where R I < R N . 9 The effort of each individual depends on the wage relative to what this individual considers to be a fair wage. In particular, we assume that the effort of individual i is given as:
where W i is the wage of worker i in the firm, and W i * is the wage which worker i considers to be fair. β is the elasticity of the effort with respect to the difference between the actual wage and the fair wage (0 < β <1). 10 The effort function shows that a worker puts more effort into the job if the wage increases relative to what is considered to be the fair wage.
8 A review of the empirical evidence for this model can be found in Howitt (2002) . 9 For the firm, there may be different hiring costs associated with employing the two types of workers, which may explain why the firm employs both types of workers although they end up getting different wages (see below). If the hiring costs of immigrants are higher than those of native workers, the wages of native workers must be higher in an equilibrium where the firm employs both types of labour.
10 This functional form of the effort function has been used by, e.g., Summers (1988) and Romer (2001) .
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The firm is assumed to determine the wage rate by minimising the wage per effort unit of the worker, i i e W . This implies that the wage is given as:
Next, we assume that the fair wage, W , depends on the outside option of the worker, R
as well as the wage norm in the firm. In particular, we assume that W is given by a weighted average of the two:
where W is the wage norm, which we assume is given as the geometric average of all wages in the firm. 11 Since there are two types of workers (natives and immigrants), the average wage becomes:
where S is the immigrant share in the firm, W I is the wage of immigrants (who are all assumed to be identical), and W N is the wage of native workers (also assumed identical).
In practice, where workers also differ in terms of observable human capital, we can think of the wages, W I and W N , as human-capital adjusted wages.
By using (3) and (4) in (2), we find that: 
11 Strictly speaking, it should be the average over all workers in the firm except worker i, but if the number of workers is not too small, the two measures will be virtually identical. We proceed as if this is the case. 
If the outside options of immigrants and natives are identical, r I = r N , it has no implications for the wages of native workers that the firm hires more immigrants.
However, if the outside options of the immigrants are worse than the outside options of native workers, r I < r N , the wages of native workers in the firm decrease as the share of immigrants goes up. Similarly, if the outside options of immigrants are better than those of native workers, r I > r N , the wages of native workers increase if the firm hires more immigrants.
Estimation Strategy
Interpreting w N as the human-capital adjusted wage of native workers, and focusing on immigrants from less developed countries, equation (7) 
where w ijt is the (log) wage of individual i in workplace j in period t, S jt is the share of immigrants from less developed countries in workplace j at time t, and X ijt is a vector of immigrants. This could be the case for, e.g., foreign-owned firms where it is well established empirically that they pay higher wages; see, e.g., Lipsey (2002) .
Alternatively, workplaces with unattractive working conditions may be required to pay higher wages (as compensation) and may at the same time attract more immigrants if these are less picky than native workers. Second, unobservable individual characteristics may also be correlated with the immigrant share if certain native workers select the workplaces that hire many (or few) immigrants.
In the estimations to follow, we control for such unobserved workplace and worker characteristics using fixed effects for each combination of worker and workplace (socalled job-spell fixed effects). This results in the following specification of our empirical model:
where θ ij is the job-spell fixed effect and φ t is a year fixed effect. With fixed effects for each worker-workplace combination, identification is based on changes in the immigrant share at a workplace over time within a job-spell. Here, the relatively long time horizon of our panel (12 years) is very useful.
Still, reverse causality may bias estimates of a 1 even with fixed effects included as in (9).
This could happen if immigrants are attracted to firms that (in some periods) pay higher wages due to unobserved demand shocks. The argument is that immigrants are more likely than native workers to be hired by firms experiencing a positive shock as immigrants are more easily available in the job market and/or have lower mobility costs; see Borjas (1999) or Borjas (2001) who argues that immigrants "grease the labour market". This in turn creates an upward bias on the estimate of a 1 in (9).
To address this problem, we instrument the share of immigrants from less developed countries in workplace j in period t, S jt . As instrument, we use the share of LDC immigrants in workplace j in 1987 (five years prior to the first year of our sample) interacted with the country level increase between 1987 and t in the employment of LDC immigrants: Networks have previously been shown to be important for the location choices of immigrants as they facilitate assimilation and the job search process; see, e.g., Munshi (2003) . It seems reasonable that such networks should also matter for job decisions.
As the country-level development in immigrant employment can safely be assumed exogenous at the workplace level, our instrument is valid by construction as long as the unobserved factors determining the historical immigrant shares do not affect subsequent wages. As job-spell fixed effects are included in the IV regressions, this is only a problem if a pre-sample temporary shock to wages (prices) affects both the immigrant share in 1987 and wages in part of the sample period. I.e. the shock should last more than five years. If the shock lasts the entire sample period, however, it will be captured by the fixed effects. Note also that similar types of instruments have previously been used by, e.g.,
Card (2001), Ottaviano and Peri (2005) , and Cortes (2006) to instrument the regional shares of immigrants.
Empirical Results
This section presents the results of the estimations. Section 4.1 contains the results from estimating the specification in (9), whereas we devote Section 4.2 to further exploration of the underlying mechanisms. In the OLS estimation in column (1), we find a significantly negative effect of the LDC immigrant share on the wages of native workers. 15 The point estimate of a 1 is -0.25. This estimate becomes numerically smaller but remains significantly negative in the fixed effects regression in column (2). More specifically, an increase in the share of immigrants from less developed countries of 1 percentage point is found to reduce earnings of native co-workers by approximately 0.14% when job-spell fixed effects are applied.
Basic Specification
[Insert Table 4 around here]
As argued above, OLS and fixed effects estimates are likely to be biased upwards due to the presence of firm-specific temporary shocks increasing wages and attracting more immigrants. To address this problem, we apply the IV strategy described in the previous section.
The first stage results (available upon request) show that our suggested instrument is highly relevant. The coefficient estimate to the (demeaned) instrument is significantly positive indicating that a higher initial share of immigrants is indeed associated with a 14 An alternative way of controlling for aggregate supply side effects of immigration would be to include the immigrant supply shock within individual i's own skill-group, as in Borjas (2003) . However, as both education and experience are poorly observed for immigrants, we stick to the former approach. 15 In the OLS regression, standard errors are clustered at the workplace level which implies robust standard errors. In the fixed effects regressions, robust standard errors are used, as the job-spell fixed effects take care of clustering at the workplace and worker level; see Wooldridge (2002) .
higher subsequent intake. Furthermore, the first stage F-statistic (reported in column (3) of Table 4 ) is 62.32, which is well above the critical value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) and to avoid problems with weak instruments that can seriously bias the IV estimates; see also Bound, et al. (1995) and .
The third column in Table 4 contains the relevant parameter estimates from the second stage wage regression. The results from this column confirm that immigrants from less developed countries have a negative effect on the wages of native workers. As expected, the IV estimate is also considerably more negative than the OLS and the fixed effects estimates in columns (1) and (2), although with a somewhat higher standard error as well.
An increase in the share of immigrants from less developed countries of 1 percentage point is now found to reduce earnings of native workers by approximately 2.2%, where the 95% confidence interval ranges from -1.35% to -3.10%.
As a check on the robustness of the IV results, we ran the IV regressions using the 1990-shares and 1992-shares of LDC immigrants at the workplace as alternative instruments (both interacted with the country-level development in the employment of LDC immigrants); see columns (4) and (5) in Table 4 . Results are very similar with estimated values of a 1 equal to -1.89 when using the 1992-share and -2.02 when using the 1990-share. The values of the first stage F-statistics are, however, somewhat smaller in these cases, indicating that the 1987-share is the strongest instrument.
Finally, we also ran the regression using all three instruments in the first stage regression.
This produced a second stage estimate of a 1 of -2.15; see column (6). Furthermore, testing for exogeneity using the Hansen J-statistic in the specification where all three instruments are used, we were not able to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments were exogenous (the p-value was 0.843).
How do Immigrants Lower Wages?
The results in Table 4 are strongly supportive of a negative causal impact of immigrant workers from less developed countries on the wages of native co-workers. We have hypothesised that this effect arises due to a general effect on the wage norm in the firm when workers with worse outside options are hired (the LDC immigrants). However, we also mentioned in Section 3.2 that there could be several alternative -although relatedchannels through which such a firm-specific effect of the use of immigrants could arise.
In this section, we try to shed some further light on the importance of these different channels.
First, in Table 5 , we include the shares of immigrants from the two other groups of origin countries: The EU-15 countries (incl. Norway and Iceland) and the other developed countries, respectively. If the effects of immigrants work through their outside options, the effects of a higher share of these other immigrants should be less negative (or even positive) -especially when it comes to the immigrants from the other EU-15 countries. In Table 5 , we therefore present results similar to those of Table 4 , but with all three immigrant shares included. For the IV regressions, we construct instruments for the additional immigrant shares in exactly the same way as we did for the LDC immigrant share by using the share in a pre-sample year (1987, 1990 or 1992) interacted with the subsequent country-level increases.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
We see from Table 5 that the estimates of the coefficients to the two additional immigrant groups are indeed significantly positive in the OLS and FE regressions in columns (1) and (2). They are also positive but, in general, insignificant in the IV regressions in columns (3)- (5), although basing the instruments on the 1990-shares causes the coefficient estimate for EU-15 immigrants to become significantly positive at the 5% level. In any case, these results are fully in accordance with an effect of immigrants working through their outside options.
Second, we test whether the negative effect of LDC immigrants apply equally to different groups of native workers. If immigrants affect the general wage norm in the firm, we should expect all workers to be affected by an increase in the use of LDC immigrants. If, on the other hand, the negative estimate reflects substitution effects within the workplace that lower the marginal product and hence the bargaining power of similar native workers -or it only affects the wage norm for similar workers -then we should expect the effect to be limited to a smaller group of the employees. In particular, we would expect a considerably smaller negative or even a positive effect for high-skilled native workers.
The reason is that LDC immigrants are to a very large extent low-skilled workers and/or work in low-skilled jobs. 16 Hence, firm-level substitution effects should mainly be of relevance to the least educated native workers, whereas higher educated native workers may in fact experience a complementarity effect. These effects can be seen as local versions of the aggregate supply effects of immigration studied in the existing literature;
see, e.g., Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) .
To investigate this issue, we ran the regressions in (9) separately for different educational groups of natives. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 6 . The OLS and FE estimates of a 1 are very similar across the different educational groups. In fact, the most negative OLS estimate is found for those with further education. This strongly suggests that the effect of hiring LDC immigrants is not restricted to similar native workers. Although, the IV estimates in columns (3), (6) and (9) indicate that the effect is most negative for unskilled native workers, the effect for native workers with a further education, column (9), is also strongly negative, and the 95% confidence intervals for the two parameter estimates overlap quite a bit. The IV estimate for workers with a vocational education is not significantly different from zero, but the instrument is also weakest in this case (the first-stage F-statistic is 14.4).
[Insert Table 6 around here]
Thus, it seems as if the effects of hiring immigrants from less developed countries are not restricted to the native workers most similar to the immigrants. This in turn suggests that something more than a local substitution effect is at work.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed and tested an additional effect of immigration on the wages of native workers. Using detailed employer-employee data from Denmark for the period 1993-2004, we have shown that an increase in the share of immigrants from less developed countries in the workplace employment lowers wages for native co-workers.
We have argued that in a labour market that is not perfectly competitive, such an effect may arise as workers and firms share firm-specific rents. The hiring of immigrants with lower outside options may then lower the wage norm in the firm or reduce the bargaining power of (similar) native workers.
Our IV estimates point to a sizeable negative effect on native wages from hiring immigrants from less developed countries at the workplace. A one percentage point increase (corresponding to the average increase in employment of these immigrants in the period 1993-2004) is associated with a negative wage effect of around 2%.
The employment of immigrants from more developed countries, on the other hand, does not reduce wages of native workers. This is consistent with these immigrants having much better outside options.
Finally, we found that the negative effect of employing LDC immigrants not only pertain to similar native workers at the workplace. Highly-educated workers are also seriously negatively affected. This indicates that the effect is not simply a firm-specific substitution effect where LDC immigrants reduce the marginal product of similar native workers and hence their bargaining position towards the firm. Instead, the result suggests that LDC immigrants reduce the general wage norm in the firm.
This in turn implies that this firm-specific wage effect of LDC immigrants may have consequences for the average wages in the economy which are not captured by studies 23 focusing on substitution effects between similar native and immigrant workers (Borjas, 2003 , and Ottaviano and Peri, 2005 (1) presents results from a wage regression for all workers, whereas column (2) restricts attention to all full-time workers. Control variables included but not reported are: Age, age^2, sex, education (three groups), industry (9 groups), and region (14 groups). Column (3) presents results from a Probit regression over the entire workforce where the dependent variable is a dummy for being unemployed. Control variables included but not reported are: Age, age^2, sex, education (three groups), and region (14 groups). The estimates reported are the marginal effects in the mean of the data. [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . The panel includes a 5% sample of full-time private sector native workers aged 18-65 from workplaces with 10+ employees. Control variables included but not reported are: 1) Individual characteristics: Experience, experience^2, tenure, tenure^2, a dummy for censored tenure in 1980, individual dummy variables for age (six groups), sex, education (three groups), marital status, children aged 0-6 years, and city size (three groups); 2) Workplace characteristics: Number of employees (log), share of women in employment, share aged 40+, share of employees with further education, share with vocational education, and twenty industry dummies; 3) Regional characteristics: Unemployment rate, share of women in employment, share aged 40+, share with further education, share with vocational education, and shares of immigrants from group 1, 2, and 3, respectively, in employment, as well as regional dummies and time trends. In columns (3), (4) and (5), the instruments used are, respectively, the 1987, 1990, and 1992 shares of the different groups of immigrants at the workplace interacted with the increase in the share of these immigrants in employment at the country level since then. 1-stage robust F-statistics are in all cases larger than 15. R-squared statistics reported in columns (3)-(5) are for the demeaned variables. Standard errors in parentheses. In column (1), standard errors are clustered by workplaces. Robust standard errors are used in columns (2)-(5). ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
